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PL INTIFF S BRIEF ON REM ND
A single issue is presented on remand: whether Price
Waterhouse proved by a preponderance of the evidence on the
existing record that Ann Hopkins  initial candidacy for
partnership would have been placed on hold  even if it had not
per itted sex-lin ed evaluations to play a part in the decision¬
making process." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775,
1793 (1989). Defendant did not meet its burden, and liability
should be imposed on the firm.
As we show below. Price Waterhouse did not prove, and could
not prove, that it would have reached the same decision on
plaintiff s candidacy in the absence of bias. In the first
place, defendant is constrained by the previous decision of this
Court as affirmed by the Supreme Court. Specifically, the
Supre e Court (1) affirmed that discrimination was a substantial
factor in Price Waterhouse's assessment of plaintiff's candidacy,
and (2) ruled that the burden properly shifted to defendant to
prove that she would have been held in any event. The Court also
made clear that uncertainties in proof must be resolved against






Price Waterhouse conf on s  not er ma or obstacle bec use
the legiti ate and ille itimate factors that led to its decision
on plaintiff are not independent of one another. Instead they
are mixed together, and defendant cannot separate them. It is
too late to unscramble the o elet. In any event, discri ination
was a substantial factor in the selection process, so Price
Waterhouse cannot deny that plaintiff would have received fewer
negative votes and less criticism if the bias had somehow been
separated out and purged. And defendant cannot prove that
plaintiff   whose professional attributes were generally
superior and in some cases unmatched    would still have been
held if such purging had occurred. At bottom, the most that
Price Waterhouse can do is speculate, and speculation is not
sufficient to sustain its burden of proof.
I. PLAINTIFF PREVAILED ON THE TWO ISSUES CRUCIAL ON REMAND:
THE EXISTENCE OF DISCRIMINATION AND BURDEN-SHIFTING
A. The Supreme Court Affir ed This Court s Key Rulings
This Court originally found that defendant s  decision not
to admit the plaintiff to partnership was tainted by
discriminatory evaluations that were the direct result of its
failure to address the evident problem of sexual stereotyping in
partners' evaluations." Hop ins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F.Supp.
1109, 1120 (D.D.C. 1985). The Court then noted that plaintiff
had "considerable problems dealing with staff and peers" so that
it "[could] not say that she would have been elected to
partnership if the Policy Board's decision had not been tainted
by sexually biased evaluations." Id. That is, plaintiff had not
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proved that she would have been promoted in the absence of
discrimination. But the Court held that the burden of proof at
this juncture was on defendant   not plaintiff   because,
[w]here sex discrimination is present, even if a promotion
decision is a mixture of legitimate and discriminatory
considerations, uncertainties must be resolved against the
employer so that the remedial purposes of Title VII will not be
thwarted by saddling an individual subject to discrimination with
an impossible burden of proof.  Id. Relying on Williams v.
Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and Day v. Mathews, 530
F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the Court held that defendant s proof
that the decision would have been the same absent
discrimination"   had to be made by clear and convincing
evidence. The Court found that Price Waterhouse had not carried
its burden. Id.
On appeal, both in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court, Price Waterhouse's two major points were (1) that this
Court was clearly erroneous in finding that Ann Hopkins had been
subjected to discrimination, and (2) that the burden of proof
should never have shifted, regardless of the strength of
plaintiff's evidence on discrimination, i.e., that plaintiff had
to prove that she would have been promoted but for discrimination
in order to establish liability under Title VII. Defendant lost
both points. The firm's fallbac  position was that, assuming
there is sufficient proof of discrimination to warrant a shift in
the burden of proof, the burden should be imposed at the
liability stage and should be satisfied by a preponderance of the
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evidence. Th  Snp *eiue Coui t eccepte  h  s fellheclc eircjume tf
although the plurality opinion observed that  Price  aterhouse
does not concretely tell us how its proof was preponderant even
if it was not clear and convincing." 109 S.Ct. at 1793.
Defendant now attempts for the first ti e to make this
showing. "Moreover, proving 7that the same decision would have
been justified ... is not the same as proving that the same
decision would have been made.'" Id. at 1791, quoting Givhan v.
estern Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 416
(1979). it is the latter that defendant must now show.
B. Discri ination Was a Substantial Factor in Price
Waterhouse s Decision
The question as to whether defendant carried its burden is
to be assessed on the existing record. This includes the
testimony and documentary evidence at trial as well as this
Court s findings which were affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed this Court s assessment of the
discrimination suffered by Hopkins. Both the plurality and
Justice O'Connor painstakingly reviewed the record and agreed
with this Court that discrimination was a significant element in
the decision to place Hopkins on hold. The plurality said that
the discrimination was a "motivating part" in the decision, 109
S.ct. at 1795; Justice O'Connor called it a "substantial
factor." Id. at 1798. Whatever the differences, if any, between
these two formulations may portend for fut re cases, it is
evident that here a majority of the Supreme Court agreed there
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was hard, clear proof of bias against Hopkins. U Thus the
plurality said that  [t]his is not, as Price Waterhouse suggests,
discrimination in the air ; rather, it is, as Hop ins puts it,
discrimination brought to ground and visited upon' an employee. 
109 S.Ct. at 1791. Similarly, Justice O'Connor saw this as a
case in which the  decisional process has been substantially
infected by discrimination.  Id. at 1800.
Throughout this litigation Price Waterhouse has argued that,
assuming there were any discrimination at all, it really did not
amount to much (i.e., "discrimination in the air ). Defendant
may now try a variant of that clai  by suggesting that there was
so little discrimination that it is evident that the firm's
decision would have been the same. Given the Supreme Court's
affirmance of this Court's findings, however, such an argument is
foreclosed. The question that Price Waterhouse must face is
this: given that "the unlawful motive was a substantial factor in
the adverse employment action," id. at 1795 (White, J.) (e phasis
in original), would the outcome have been the same without that
factor?
C. Uncertainties Must Be Resolved Against Price Waterhouse
Price Waterhouse cannot satisfy its burden. Its attempt to
do so inevitably ends in speculation and uncertainty. And
because the burden of proof is now on defendant, uncertainties
jj  in the past, the Court has used the terms "substantial
factor" and "motivating factor" interchangeably. E.g., Mt.
Healthy City School District Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
287 (1977).
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must be resolved against the firm. This point is clear from the
Supreme Court s endorsement of this Court's approach on burden-
shifting.
Justice O Connor saw the shift in the burden of persuasion
as  strong medicine," 109 S.Ct. at 1797, that needed to be
administered here. Quoting this Court's finding that plaintiff
"proved that Price Waterhouse 'permitt[ed] stereotypical
attitudes towards women to play a significant, though
un uantifiable, role in its decision not to invite her to beco e
a partner,'" Justice O'Connor said that "[a]t this point Ann
Hopkins had taken her proof as far as it could go.  109 S.Ct. at
1802 (citation omitted). This was enough to shift the burden of
proof to defendant:
Particularly in the context of the professional world,
where decisions are often made by collegial bodies on
the  asis of largely subjective criteria, requiring
the plaintiff to pro e that any or  factor was the
definitive cause of the decisionmaker's action may be
tanta ount to declaring Title VII i applicable to such
decisions.
Id. at 1803 (emphasis in original).
The message here is the same as that originally conveyed by
this Court in requiring burden-shifting where both legitimate and
illegitimate motives are present: "uncertainties  ust be resolved
against the e ployer so that the remedial purposes of Title VII
will not be thwarted by saddling an individual subject to
discri ination with an impossible burden of proof." 618 F.Supp.
at 1120. Hence it is clear that the decisive principle  
resolution of uncertainties against the employer   flows from
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the shift in the burden itself, and not from any particular
standard of proof that defendant  ust satisfy.
This point is driven home even more forcefully by the
plurality and Justice White. Both rely on two cases outside the
Title VII context   NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462
u. s. 393 (1983), and Mt. Healthy City School District Bd. of Ed.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)   for the proposition that the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant upon an appropriate
showing by plaintiff. It is significant that both cases treat
the burden on defendant as one of proof by preponderant evidence
(hence the result on this issue here). Yet it is also clear, as
is evident from the approval given Transportation Management s
justification for burden-shifting, that the employer who is
assigned this burden must bear the risk of uncertainty:
[t]he employer is a  rongdoer; he has acted out of a
motive that is declared illegitimate by the statute.
It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of
legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because
he kno ingly created the risk and because the risk was
created not by innocent activity but by his o n
wrongdoing. 
109 S.Ct. at 1790 (citing 462 U.S. at 403). U
In short, the principle that "uncertainties must be resolved
against the employer," 618 F.Supp. at 1120, remains constant
regardless of the particular degree of proof involved.
7J See also Justice O Connor s concurrence, 109 S.Ct. at
1802 ("placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the defendant in a
situation where uncertainty as to causation has been created by
its consideration of an illegitimate criterion makes sense as a
rule of evidence and furthers the substantive com and of Title
VII ).
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II. THE LA FUL AND UNLA FUL FACTORS IN PRICE WATERHOUSE S
DECISION WERE INTERDEPENDENT AND CANNOT BE SEPARATED
A. The Lawful and Unlawful Factors Are Not Sub ect to
Separate Analysis
This case involved both a  subtle process," 618 F.Supp. at
1118, and a "mixture of legiti ate and discriminatory
considerations," id. at 1120. It is not a case in which the
legitimate and illegitimate factors were clearly and identifiably
independent of one another. If that were so if, for example,
Price Waterhouse questioned Hopkins  interpersonal s ills but
also maintained some type of objective requirement that she
arguably did not meet   then the analysis would be
straightforward. That is, the firm could concede for the sake of
argument that its assessment of Hopkins' interpersonal skills was
substantially infected with discrimination, yet still assert that
she would not have been promoted because she did not meet the
independent legitimate requirement. The burden of proof would of
course remain on defendant to prove the existence of such an
independent standard unmet by plaintiff, but it is possible   at
least in principle   to envision how this burden could be met.
Indeed, this was the situation in Mt. Healthy. There the
activity protected by the First Amendment   a telephone call to
a radio station concerning a teacher appearance policy   was
independent of unprotected misconduct (such as making obscene
gestures to students). Plaintiff proved that hi  protected
activity was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the
decision not to rehire him, but the Supreme Court gave the
defendant school board the opportunity to argue that the same
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decision would have been made based solely on the independent
isconduct. 429 U.S. at 287.
In the present case, however, the legitimate and
illegitimate motivations are inextricably intertwined, and both
relate to plaintiff s interpersonal dealings. Thus this Court
has stated that  Price Waterhouse has conceded that plaintiff was
ualified to be considered for partnership and probably would
have been admitted but for the complaints about her interpersonal
skills," 618 F.Supp. at 1113, and that these criticisms were "the
determinative reason for the firm's decision,  id. at 1115. The
Court found that these concerns were not fabricated, as
plaintiff's conduct provided  amp1e justification" for
complaint. Id. at 1114. But the Court also found   and this
was the heart of the decision   that sexual stereotyping
influenced many partners' comments on plaintiff's interpersonal
s ills, and that she was harmed by this:
This is not a case where  stan ards w re shaped only
by neutral professional an  technical considerations
an  not b  any ster otypical notions of female roles
a   images." * * * Discriminato y ster otyping of
females was permitted to play a part. Ccmments
influenced by sex stereotypes   re made by partners;
the firm's evaluation process gave substantial weight
to these c mments; and the partners ip failed to
rVi-rpgfi the conspicuous problem of stereotyping in
partnership evaluations.
618 F.Supp. at 1120 (citation omitted).
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Defendant is faced with proving that the comments made about
plaintiff s interpersonal skills, when drained of their
substantial discriminatory infection, would still have been
sufficient to bloc  her candidacy. Price Waterhouse, however,
elected not to present its case in the alternative at trial.
That is, the firm never conceded   even for the sake of argument
that discrimination played a role in the decision on Hopkins,
so defendant never sought to introduce testimonial or other
evidence specifically aimed at showing that the same decision
would have been made even absent bias. In addition, the firm did
not seek at the time of the decision to scrutinize the sexist
content of the evaluations of plaintiff. Indeed, it was
defendant's very fail re to undertake such contemporaneous
scrutiny that contributed to this Court's finding of
discrimination. For example:
The evidence i dicates that Price Water ouse should
have been aware that  omen bei g e al ated by male
partners might well be victi s of discriminatory
stereo ypes. Yet the firm  ade no efforts ... to
investigate c mments to determine  hether they were
influenced by stereotypes.
* * *
Neither a partnership nor any other e  loyer can
remain indifferent to indications that its e aluation
system is subject to sex bias, as Price Waterhouse did
in plaintiff's case.
618 F.Supp. at 1119.
The problem of proof that defendant now confronts is a
result not just of its failure to discourage stereotyping but
also of its failure  to investigate and discard, where
appropriate, co  ents that suggest a double standard.  Id. at
1120. The S preme Court agreed that this Court correctly
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emphasized this fail re. The plurality s su  ary of the evidence
of discri ination ends by stating that  the fir  in no way
disclaimed reliance on those particular com ents [that were the
product of stereotyping"], either in Hopkins' case or in the
past.  109 S.Ct. at 1794.
Having wrongly failed to have scrutinized and discarded
biased evaluations at the ti e the decision on Hopkins was made.
Price Waterhouse is in a poor position to undertake such scrutiny
today. There is an especially high degree of  risk that the
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated,  but
defendant  ust bear this risk because it  was created not by
innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing.  Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 403.
In sum, this is not a case in which the legitimate and
illegitimate  otives are independent of one another. They are
mixed together in one omelet. Defendant once had a chance to
separate the ingredients but failed to do so. Today it can only
seek to unscramble its creation. Again, this is a highly
speculative enterprise, productive of much uncertainty. And the
uncertainty, having been caused by defendant, must be resolved
against it.
B. Thomas Beyer's Comments Hi hlight the Difficulty in
Separating the Lawful and Unlawful Factors
After Ann Hopkins was placed on hold, she discussed her
chances for future selection with Thomas Beyer, the partner-in¬
charge of her office and an ardent supporter. This Court found
that Beyer was  responsible for telling plaintiff what problems
11
He advisedthe Policy Board had identified with her candidacy. 
her to "walk more femininely, tal  more femininely, dress  ore
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry." 618 F.Supp. at 1117. Price Waterhouse has tried
throughout this litigation to downplay the significance of this
evidence. Thus defen ant argue  m the Supreme Court that this
Court was clearly erroneous in finding that Beyer was responsible
for conveying the Policy Board7s concerns to Hopkins and asserted
that his advice to her was purely idiosyncratic. The Supreme
Court, however, "reject[ed] this claim," noting Policy Board and
Admissions Committee member Marcel1in7 s testimony that "Beyer
knew exactly where the problems were  regarding Hopkins." 109
S.Ct. at 1793, n.15.
Beyer's advice, which the plurality in the Supre e Court
called "memorable," id. at 1793, was an important element in
plaintiff's proof that discrimination was a substantial factor in
the decision on her candidacy. But it is also relevant   indeed
crucial   to an assessment of defendant's proof now. For if the
partner who "knew exactly where the problems were," and who was
responsible for telling [plaintiff] what problems the Policy
Board had identified with her candidacy," understood that these
could be solved by an increased measure of traditional
12
femininity,  then defendant cannot prove that any residual
concerns unrelated to sex would have led to the hold decision.  
III. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
WOULD STILL HAVE BEEN HELD IF THE SELECTION PROCESS HAD
BEEN FREE OF DISCRIMINATION
The decision to place Ann Hopkins on hold was  ade
collectively, and a large number of men had a hand in it,
including the members of the Admissions Committee and the Policy
Board (of which the Admissions Committee is a part). In
addition, "[a]11 the evaluators were men." 618 F.Supp. at
1118. Even so, fewer than five percent of Price Waterhouse s 662
partners submitted written comments   either long or short form
on plaintiff. Many were strong supporters. It was the
negative short form comments of some ten partners that blocked
her admission.
Specifically, 32 partners commented on Hopkins' candidacy.
The long form comments   i.e., those from partners who knew
plaintiff best   were quite supportive and tallied 4-1-1 in her
favor (and the one negative vote was discounted because it came
from a partner, Mr. Statland, who was generally negative about
candidates) [Def. Ex. 27; PI. Ex. 17 at 3846; Tr. 90-91]. Of the
26 short form com entators, however, several voiced strident
opposition; i.e., seven voted "no" and a few others who did not
formally vote nevertheless recorded intensely negative co ments
ZJ See 109 S.Ct. at 1793 ("if an employee's flawed 'inter¬
personal skills' can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new
shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her
interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism ).
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[Def. Ex. 27]. As this Co rt found, it was these negative short
form co  ents that scuttled plaintiff s candidacy. That is, the
negative comments and the significant number of 'no' votes, most
of which were by partners filing short forms because of their
limited contact with the plaintiff, were determinative in the
Admissions Committee's decision to recommend  that she be placed
on hold. 618 F. Supp. at 1113 (emphasis supplied). That
recommendation was adopted by the Policy Board.
The reason these negative views were decisive was because
Price Waterhouse pays special deference to negative comments,
whatever their source. That is,  the negative com ents of short
for  evaluators . . . are treated as serious reservations and
given great weight," id. at 1116, and so "[t]he Policy Board gave
great weight to the negative views of individuals who had very
little contact with the plaintiff,  id. at 1118. Somewhat more
colloguially, Joseph Connor, Price Waterhouse's Senior Partner
and Chairman of the Policy Board, said that "those who had less
than full ti e involvement with Ann, were in effect the deciders
on this one" [J. Connor dep. 62].
This Court found that the negative co  ents that resulted in
the hold decision were "influenced by sex stereotyping.  618 F.
Supp at 1120. As noted above, the Supreme Court expressly
affirmed this finding and agreed as well that the discrimination
was not incidental but instead was a substantial factor in Price
Waterhouse's decision on plaintiff. In addition, the
discrimination was subtle, as this Court recognized:  [a] far
more subtle process is involved when one who is in a distinct
14
minority may be viewed differently by the majority because the
individual deviates from an artificial standardized profile. 
618 F. Supp. at 1118. The mixture of substantial yet subtle
discrimination makes it even more difficult for defendant to
unscramble the o elet.
In a fair context Ann Hop ins would have been viewed, in
Joseph Connor's words, as a  good capable professional" [J.
Connor dep. 29] who was enthusiastically endorsed by her office
[Pi. Ex. 15], who had brought in more business and billed more
hours than any of the other candidates then under consideration,
and whose interpersonal skills had been questioned (although not
intensely) by a small nu ber of partners. The burden on Price
Waterhouse today is to show that such a candidate would have been
placed on hold, and the evidence of record simply does not
support such an assertion. There is no question, of course, that
candidates for partnership have been "regularly held because of
concerns about their interpersonal skills." 618 F. Supp. at
1116. But there is also no question that others have been
admitted despite such concerns.
The record on this point is both testimonial and
documentary. The documents include the memoranda which accompany
the Ad issions Co  ittee s "hold" recom endations as well as the
minutes of the Policy Board. The Admissions Committee, however,
does not prepare memoranda on candidates for whom admission is
4/ As to business generation, this Court found that "[n]one
of the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year
had a comparable record in terms of successfully securing major
contracts for the partnership." 618 F. Supp. at 1112.
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recommended [Tr. 290], so it is not possible from the Committee s
written recommendations to determine whether candidates are
proposed for admission despite reservations about their
interpersonal skills. But Donald Ziegler, the Chairman of the
Admissions Committee, was as ed about this at trial, and his
response was unequivocal:
Q. It's true, isn't it, that there are occasions in
which you recammend yes on a candidate when there have
been some reservations ex ressed about interpersonal




Even though the Admissions Co mittee does not write
memoranda on candidates whose ad ission is recommended, some
documentation exists on individuals who were admitted despite
concern about interpersonal skills. Plaintiff has previously
pointed to these (e.g., one candidate conveyed the image of a
Marine drill sergeant" and was seen as  crude, crass, etc.  but
was defended as "a man's man; he is very direct  [PI. Ex. 20 at
5114]; another had been described "in such terms as 'lacking
maturity,' 'wise-guy attitude,' and 'cocky'" [PI. Ex. 25]; others
had received "negative comments" for "stubborness and
inflexibility" or had received a "great no. [of] 'no's'" ste  ing
from a "weak first impression," with the latter candidate being
defended because "in areas in which he is working they want
results and are not concerned abt. 1st impressions  [PI. Ex. 20
at 5128, 5148-49]).
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This Court has already ruled that, where plaintiff had the
burden of proof, the evidence as to these four candidates was not
sufficient to prove discriminatory disparate treatment. 618 F.
Supp. at 1115. A  business decision" contributed to the
admission of the first two candidates, and all four "evoked fewer
and less intense negative comments than the plaintiff." Id.
n.6. That is, accepting all co  ents at face value, the
criticisms of plaintiff were more numerous and more intense than
for these male candidates.
At this stage of these proceedings, however, it is a given
that the criticisms of Hop ins were "influenced by sex
stereotyping," 618 F.Supp. at 1120, and hence should not have
been accepted at face value. Moreover, the burden of proof is
now on defendant   not plaintiff   to show that Hopkins would
have been held even if this discrimination had somehow been
cleansed from the process. And here the testimony of Mr.
Ziegler, as well as the documentary evidence concerning
candidates who had been accepted despite reservations about their
interpersonal dealings, is relevant. This evidence shows that a
perceived proble  with interpersonal skills was not necessarily
sufficient to place a candidacy on hold. What was important was
the manner and intensity of the concern   whether it was
translated into strong opposition by so e of the partners (as
with plaintiff) or into  ild criticism or even approbation ("[h]e
is a  an s man").
In short, the Admissions Committee and Policy Board engage
in a balancing process to determine whether the perceived
17
problems are outweighed by other qualities [Tr. 282]. The Court
has expressed its reluctance at  second-guessing  defendant s
balancing of professional attributes, 618 F. Supp. at 1115, and
it is not necessary to do so here. On the contrary, Price
Waterhouse  ust prove that it still would have struck the balance
so as to place plaintiff on hold   despite her generally
superior attributes   even if the stereotyping that
characterized her evaluations had been separated out and purged.
Defendant has not proved this. It would be a different case
if the firm invariably refused to ad it otherwise qualified
candidates where reservations had been expressed about their
interpersonal skills. But that is not what this record shows.
Any effort to parade candidates who were obstensibly held or
rejected because of concerns about interpersonal skills misses
the mark. First, as noted above, this Court has already found
that defendant held some candidates whose interpersonal skills
were criticized. But others advanced to partnership, as we have
shown. There was no bright line test. Further, there is no
dispute that plaintiff was generally seen as a superior candidate
and "probably would have been admitted but for the complaints
about her interpersonal skills." 618 F. Supp. at 1113 . A ong
other things, she brought "extras," such as demonstrated skill in
practice develop ent, that the firm was seeking over and above
technical proficiency [Tr. 282-83].
Here it is significant that the candidates whom defendant
sought at trial to identify as having been held or rejected
because of personality problems were lackluster individuals whose
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personal traits served only to seal their fates, or else had
with such things as practice development, technical
skill or  ana ement ability in addition to personality (e.g., D.
Faught (1981):  coupled with lack of any clear professional
superiority, reservations concerning his personality result in
the conclusion that Faught has only limited prospects for further
advancement and is not qualified for admission." D. Miller
(1982): "In view of the absence of  ny outstanding positive
attributes, the Co mittee believes that Miller s personality
makes him an unsuitable candidate for admission." M. Rosenbury
(1982): "Given the absence of any distinguishing characteristics
which suggest professional superiority, the Committee does not
view Rosenbury as being qualified for admission." A. Parden, Jr.
(1980): "has not exhibited strong practice development
attributes." T. Bayless, Jr. (1981): "sometimes has a tendency
to be erratic and overstate facts. He has exhibited some
weaknesses in project management . . ." M. Cohn (1984):
"questions about how  eaningful and effective his practice
development activities have been and what extras he would bring
to the partnership." R. Beal (1981): "adequate, but not
outstanding technically." C. Borkowski (1982): "some
difficulties in dealing with lower level staff of clients  as
well as concerns that "he will not bring any 'extra' to the
firm.  [Def.Ex. 64]).
In sum, Ann Hop ins was a well qualified candidate for
partnership. She was a "highly competent project leader  whose
clients admired her and whose business production was
19
unmatched. 618 F.Supp. at 1112-13. The only concerns expressed
about her dealt with her interpersonal skills, and these concerns
were in substantial measure anchored in impermissible
stereotype. The record si ply does not show that an otherwise
well qualified candidate would also have been held if the
concerns about her interpersonal skills had been less numerous
and more muted ——  s would have been the case here if
discrimination were purged. To be sure, there is an area of
uncertainty about this. Plaintiff did not prove that she would
have been admitted in the absence of discrimination, but neither
has defendant proved that she would have been placed on hold in a
fair setting. And this uncertainty should be resolved against
Price Waterhouse. 109 S.Ct at 1790.
Two other points are important to this analysis. The first
concerns Mr. Connor. He admired Hopkins and initially supported
her candidacy but deferred to the negative comments made by
several of his partners. Mr. Connor said he  was surprised and
disappointed with the widespread nature and intensity of the
negative com ents on Ann. I thought she would have a different
row to hoe on this one because she had done a good job. I was
not aware of these proble s that others began to point out"
[J. Connor dep. 88]. To the contrary, he knew and liked her
personally: "As an individual, I thought she was fine" fid. at
94]. if the short form co ments had been less hostile   as they
would have been if free of bias  ¦ Mr. Connor would have been
able to follow his personal inclination to support her and would
have been a strong voice in her behalf. His testimony, however,
20
graphically illustrates t e manner in which Policy Board  e bers
responded to the mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
comments.
Second, this Court recognized that plaintiff was harmed, in
part, by sex-based comments made by her supporters. This is
because there was no objective test for admission based on the
number of either positive or negative votes, so the firm  did not
simply review the  yes s  and 'no's' regarding a candidate, but
carefully reviewed the content of the submitted comments. 
109 s.Ct. at 1794. (Of course, as noted above, the firm did not
examine the comments with  n eye toward bi s.) Indeed, it was
the firm's consideration of all comments   pro and con   that
led the Supreme Court to endorse this Court's approach in dee ing
relevant  suspect comments . . . made by supporters ... of
Hop ins.  Specifically,  [a] negative comment, even when made in
the context of a generally favorable review, nevertheless may
influence the decisionmaker to think less highly of the candidate
...  Id. Indeed, as Defendant's Exhibit 27 shows, the
Admissions Committee emphasizes all negative comments by
indenting them, frequently in midsentence.
In fact, some of plaintiff's supporters expressed reserva¬
tions reflecting stereotyping (e.g., MacVeagh: "she has matured
from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr to an
authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady ptr
candidate" [Def. Ex. 27]; Coffey: " ay have overcompensated for
being a woman  [Def. Ex. 31]). So today it should be presumed
not only that Hopkins' opponents would have been less numerous
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and negative in the absence of stereotyping, but also that her
supporters would have been more positive if bias had been separated
out and ignored as a  atter of policy. Defendant cannot unscr  ble
the  mixture of legitimate and discriminatory considerations" that
it has created. 618 F. Supp. at 1120.
CONCLUSION
Price Waterhouse did not carry its burden under the clear and
convincing standard, and it fares no better under the preponderance
test, under both, undertainties caused by the firm s discriminatory
conduct must be resolved against it. Defendant cannot pars  the
record today to separate out the substantial factor of discrimination,
and it cannot show that a generally superior candidate would have been
held because of more muted criticisms of personality than plaintiff
actually received. Price  aterhouse's argument is necessarily
speculative, and speculation is not enough to sustain its burden of
proof. 109 S.Ct. at 1790.
The Court should enter a finding of liability against defendant.
Respectfully submitted.
Ja es  H. Heller 79350
KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER







On November 3, 1989 plaintiff s Proposed Findings of Fact and
Brief on Re and were delivered to:
Theodore B. Olson
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
